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Non-Market Household Time and the Cost of
Children
March 10, 2007
Abstract
Raising children demands a considerable amount of parental time, obliging working par-
ents either to further reduce their leisure or to buy child-care services in the market. Parents
may face additional opportunity costs upon deciding to participate in the labor market, but
these are diﬃcult to measure. Using a survey instrument in Belgium and Germany, we esti-
mate the income compensation needed to maintain family well-being when adults work vs.
when they do not enter the labor market. In both countries we ﬁnd that full-time working
parents face extra child costs and require higher labor-market-participation compensation
compared to childless adults.
Key Words: equivalent income, household well-being, reservation wage, child costs,
parental unemployment trap, survey method
JEL Classiﬁcation: D13, J22, J13, C42, I38, H31
2
1. Introduction
In a literature survey about how children aﬀect the economic behavior of households Brown-
ing (1992, p. 1470-1) noted:
“Every aspect of household economic behavior is significantly correlated with the
presence of children in the household. [...] children [...] do play a central role in
understanding all facets of household economic behavior.”
A particular feature of households with children is that children must be raised by the
adults in the household. Child care requires the investment of time, eﬀort, and other re-
sources on the part of adult household members. The constraints faced by adults in this
regard are aﬀected by the labor-market-participation status of the adult household mem-
bers: working adults have less non-market time available for child care and other household-
production activities than do nonworking adults.
We design a survey instrument in order to estimate the tradeoﬀ between non-market
time and household income. This tradeoﬀ is given by the income compensation for a re-
duction in non-market time required to keep family well-being constant. Empirically, we
investigate whether the time/money tradeoﬀ is higher in households with children vs. those
without children. Further, we estimate child costs for households with working vs. non-
working adults. Such estimates help in evaluating whether transfers to reduce child poverty
are equitable across diﬀerent household types. Examining whether children aﬀect labor-
market-participation compensation enables us to evaluate whether tax allowance policies
that reward working parents create suﬃcient work incentives to move parents out of an un-
employment/poverty trap (for example, see Brewer (2001), who discusses related policies in
the US and the UK).
1
Econometric approaches such as this suggested in Apps and Rees (2001) specify demand
systems in order to estimate child costs in diﬀerent household types from consumption
and time-use data. Various factors make this approach challenging. No existing database
drawn from the same sample of households contains information about both time use and
consumption (Gronau and Hamermesh (2006, p. 3)). Even if such a database existed, its in-
formational content would be limited. For example, the variable ‘wage’ can be observed only
for the sub-sample of working people, making —eﬀectively— a sample selection correction nec-
essary (Wooldridge (2002, p. 552)). Other information is not collected at all: the extent to
which household members share goods within the household; the quantity/quality of domes-
tic production; and not least, “who gets what” (Browning (1992, p. 1470)). As a result, to
infer prices of domestic goods, including the value of time that adults devote to child-related
activities, estimated demand systems depend critically upon (a-priori untestable) exogeneity
assumptions, assumptions on within-household sharing rules and functional forms of house-
hold production processes, as well as identiﬁcation restrictions (for example, see Donaldson
and Pendakur (2004, 2006) for references concerning restrictions such as “equivalence-scale
exactness” used to identify household cost functions, and generalizations they suggest).
Our approach does not rely upon the speciﬁcation of a theoretical model and thus avoids
the need to make modeling assumptions that are a-priori untestable. Our survey method
requires respondents to perform a set of evaluation tasks that are directly related to the es-
timation of child costs in diﬀerent household types. Similarly with Koulovatianos, Schröder,
and Schmidt (2005), our approach relies on the idea that respondents, based on their daily
experiences and choices, are capable of providing reliable assessments when asked the follow-
ing type of question: “Which family-income level can make a household with one working
and one nonworking adult with two children achieve the same well-being as a household
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with a nonworking single childless adult and a monthly family income of $1,000, in your
opinion? What income would one need if instead both adults were nonworking? If both
adults were working?” The answers we obtain are equivalent incomes, i.e. disposable family
incomes that make the well-being of households with diﬀerent demographic composition and
labor-market-participation status equal. So, the time/money tradeoﬀ is captured by the
diﬀerence between equivalent incomes of two household types that diﬀer only with respect
to the non-market time endowment (NMTE) of adult household members.
We have conducted this survey in two countries, Belgium and Germany, focusing on two
types of reductions in NMTE. Starting from a household where all adult members are non-
working, we distinguish: (i) a nonrestrictive reduction in NMTE that leads to a ‘traditional’
household with one working and one nonworking adult; (ii) a restrictive reduction in NMTE
that leads to a situation in which all adults in the household work full time. We ﬁnd that
the time/money tradeoﬀ corresponding to nonrestrictive reductions in NMTE is typically
unaﬀected by the presence of children in the household. On the contrary, in both countries,
it is always the case that, in response to a restrictive reduction in NMTE, the time/money
tradeoﬀ increases whenever children are present.
As a robustness check, we use regression analysis to estimate child costs relative to
an adult, after controlling for economies of household size and also for several personal
characteristics of the survey’s respondents. Consistently with our results above, child-cost
estimates are higher in time-constrained families when compared to households where at
least one adult is nonworking. These ﬁndings suggest that parents may face additional
opportunity costs upon deciding to start working full time, except in one important case:
when one of the two nonworking parents decides to go to work. Accordingly, income-tax-
allowance policies that aim at increasing work incentives need to favor working parents.
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Our results also have broader implications for the building of applied models of the
household: as in Apps and Rees (2001), both child-care time and that a household’s adults
can specialize in market vs. domestic activities need to be modeled explicitly. Apart from
providing such general guidelines for modeling, survey-based estimates of equivalent incomes
can be used to test the validity of identiﬁcation restrictions that demand systems impose
(for example, Koulovatianos, Schröder, and Schmidt (2005) test the restriction of “gener-
alized equivalence scale exactness”). Furthermore, the ‘calibration’ line of research on the
family, such as Aiyagari et al. (2000) and Greenwood et al. (2005) among others, can
beneﬁt from the additional, complementary information that a survey such as ours adds to
existing databases. For example, calibration-based models use parameters that cannot be
veriﬁed empirically due to econometric identiﬁcation problems (see Gronau (2006)). Survey
estimates of equivalent incomes add a ‘goodness of ﬁt’ criterion to such models and help in
assessing the validity of their parameters.
In Section 2 we describe the structure of our survey and the samples we use. In Section
3 we analyze the time/money tradeoﬀs faced by diﬀerent family types with an emphasis
on a comparison of families with children vs. families without children. In Section 4 we
provide estimates of child costs in families with diﬀerent labor-market-participation status.
We discuss the policy relevance of our results in Section 5 and we make concluding remarks
in Section 6.
2. Survey structure and samples
Our questionnaire consists of three sections, reproduced in the Appendix. The ﬁrst section
gives the respondents an overview and explains the task they are to perform. The second
section collects some personal characteristics of the respondents that could possibly aﬀect
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their assessments.
The core questions of our survey are contained in the third section in the form of a 20-cell
table (see the Appendix). Each cell corresponds to a particular household type characterized
by: (i) number of adults; (ii) number of children; (iii) labor-market-participation status of
adults. Moving downwards within each column of the table, the number of children increases
(from zero to three children). Moving across rows from left to right, the number of adults
increases, from one to two adults, and the labor-market-participation status of each adult
also varies between nonworking and working full time. Denoting a nonworking adult by “N”
and a full-time working adult by “W ,” the sequence from left to right is, “N , W , NN , WN ,
WW .”
The ﬁrst cell of the questionnaire’s table provides a reference income, the disposable
monthly income of a reference household, a nonworking single childless adult. All remaining
19 cells are left empty. Respondents are asked to ﬁll them in with after-tax/transfer monthly
household incomes that bring all households to the same level of well-being as that of the
reference household. Setting these equivalent incomes is the central task that respondents
perform in this survey.
Implementing this survey in Belgium and Germany, we asked our respondents explicitly
to assume only adults of age 35 to 55 and children of age 7-11 in the households they
were asked to consider. Moreover, we were interested in obtaining child-cost estimates for
diﬀerent levels of household well-being. To this end, respondents were provided with three
20-cell tables of the form appearing in the Appendix, each giving a diﬀerent income for
the reference household. The three reference-income levels used in the questionnaire cover a
broad range of the disposable-monthly-income distributions of the two countries. The lowest
reference income, 500 Euros (EUR), is a proxy for the absolute poverty line (approximately
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the social-security beneﬁt for single-childless adults in both Belgium and Germany). The
other two reference incomes are EUR 2000 and EUR 3500.
Our samples consist of 149 respondents in Belgium and 164 in Germany. The question-
naire appeared on the internet and was advertised through web newsletters in both countries.
Each respondent was oﬀered the right to participate in a lottery with expected payoﬀ equal
to EUR 5. The Belgian sample was collected in April 2002, the German sample in February
2005. Table 1 presents a breakdown of the sample statistics for both countries. The gender
distribution of the German sample is relatively male-biased. In both countries, most respon-
dents are between 20-40 years of age and highly educated. These biases are related to the
distribution of internet-user attributes.
3. Equivalent-income proﬁles and time/money tradeoﬀs
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the sample means of the stated equivalent incomes. An immediate observa-
tion is that respondents always compensate households for a reduction in NMTE. This is a
plausible result, consistent with predictions by theories of the value of time in the literature.
Figure 1 depicts the information given by Table 2. The horizontal axis of each graph
represents a household’s available NMTE. The value “1” on the horizontal axis is for the
case when all adults in the household are nonworking. The value “0” means that all adults
in the household work full time. For the case of two-adult households in which one adult is
working and the other is nonworking, the value “0.5” has been assigned. The vertical axis
is used for equivalent incomes. Each point plotted represents an average equivalent income,
one point for each mixture of household characteristics (given in Table 2). For example,
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consider the entry “WN , yr = 500, 2 children” for Belgium in Table 2. There we have the
average equivalent income of EUR 1614.35 for a couple with two children where one adult is
working and the other is nonworking (reference income of EUR 500). This entry is plotted
with a “” symbol which is in the middle of the line labeled “2 children” on the graph
“Couples, poor (EUR 500)” in Figure 1.
For any given family type presented in Figure 1 solid lines connect equivalent incomes
that correspond to particular levels of NMTE. All solid lines in Figure 1 are downward
sloping. This implies that, in both countries, for any given family type, a reduction in NMTE
is always associated with a positive income compensation that captures the time/money
tradeoﬀ. Figure 1 also shows that as the number of children increases equivalent incomes
increase as well.
In each of the twelve graphs of Figure 1, the dashed lines are the “No children” lines
shifted upwards in a parallel manner. Diﬀerences between slopes of dashed and solid lines
reveal diﬀerences in the time/money tradeoﬀ between families with children vs. families
without children. In both countries, the dashed lines that correspond to couples and a
reduction in NMTE from “1” to “0.5,” are hardly distinguishable from the solid lines. So, the
time/money tradeoﬀ is not aﬀected by the presence of children in the case of a nonrestrictive
reduction in NMTE: a transition from “NN” to “WN .” On the contrary, when reductions
in NMTE are restrictive (transition from “N” to “W ,” or from “WN” to “WW”), solid lines
are steeper than dashed lines. This means that the presence of at least one child increases
the time/money tradeoﬀ in response to a restrictive reduction in NMTE.
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3.2 Testing the eﬀect of children on time/money tradeoﬀs
Table 3 presents statistical tests of the pattern revealed by the comparison of solid lines and
dashed lines in Figure 1. The symbols “N → W ,” “NN → WN ,” and “WN → WW ,”
denote a transition from a particular constellation of labor-market participation of adults in
a household to another constellation. The reduction in NMTE implied by “NN →WN” is
nonrestrictive, while “N →W” and “WN →WW” imply restrictive reductions in NMTE.
Table 3 presents compensations for speciﬁc reductions in NMTE by family type. Diﬀerences
in these compensations due to the presence of more children reﬂect diﬀerences in the slopes
of solid lines in Figure 1.
To test for the eﬀect of children on time/money tradeoﬀs we investigate the statistical
signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in compensations for reductions in NMTE as the number of children
increases. For each reference income, at the bottom and in-between each two consecutive
columns of descriptive statistics in Table 3, appears a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistic
and its p-value. It tests the equality of medians that correspond to these adjacent columns.
The reason to use Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests instead of pairwise t-tests is that normality
is not guaranteed for the errors of the sample means, as this can be seen by the descriptive
statistics presented in Table 3. Since the compared observations come from the same sample
of respondents they are not independent. For this reason, diﬀerences in compensations for
reductions in NMTE stated by each individual are tested against a 0-value null hypothesis.
The Wilcoxon tests support the pattern seen in Figure 1. In all cases of restrictive reduc-
tions in NMTE children are associated with a stronger time/money tradeoﬀ. In particular,
in almost all of these cases the presence of each additional child increases this tradeoﬀ.
On the contrary, if the reduction in NMTE is nonrestrictive, children typically do not af-
fect time/money tradeoﬀs; and if they do, their impact on these tradeoﬀs is quantitatively
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smaller compared to restrictive reductions in NMTE (this small impact can also be seen in
Figure 1).
Our results indicate that time for child-related activities is an essential component of child
costs. This is corroborated by research based on time-use data: according to Gronau and
Hamermesh (2006, p. 5, Table 1), besides sleep, child care is the second most time-intensive
activity after leisure; Bradbury (2005) shows that parents reduce leisure considerably in
order to raise their children. Fully working parents (W and WW ) must either reduce their
already limited leisure even more, or buy child-care and other housework services in the
market. Traditional households (WN) may still accommodate the time component of child
related activities: for example, as in Apps and Rees (2001), the nonworking partner can
specialize in these activities. The role of time for child related activities has a general
implication for child costs that is consistent with Figure 1 and the tests appearing in Table
3: child costs should be higher in time-constrained families when compared to households
in which at least one adult is nonworking. In Section 4 we estimate child costs conditional
upon the NMTE of adults and test for this implication.
4. Labor-market-participation status of adults and child costs
The regression analysis in this section has two purposes. First, it checks the robustness of
the results presented in Section 3 by controlling for respondents’ personal characteristics.
Second, the regressions provide estimates of child costs conditional upon the labor-market-
participation status of adults after controlling for household-size economies.
The ﬁrst regression model that follows Banks and Johnson (1994) and will serve as
benchmark is,
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EIRi,y =
(
nA + αy · nC + βy · nW
)θy
+ by · PERSONALi + ei,y . (1)
The variable EIRi,y is an equivalent-income ratio: it is the equivalent income stated by
respondent i, divided by the reference income, y, of a nonworking single childless adult.
The variable nA is the number of adults, nC is the number of children, and nW is the
number of working adults in the household. So, nA, nW , and nC deﬁne the household type.
Parameter θy controls for household-size economies at reference income y. Dividing the
stated equivalent income by the corresponding reference income (i.e., using EIRi,y as the
dependent variable) will give estimates of parameters αy, βy, and θy, that are comparable
across diﬀerent reference incomes, y. Parameter βy is the compensation for a reduction in
NMTE relative to the cost of a nonworking adult. Parameter αy gives the cost of a child
relative to a nonworking adult. PERSONALi is a set of conditioning variables that comprise
the personal characteristics of respondent i, listed in Table 1. Finally, ei,y is the error term.
Columns labeled “Spec. 1” in Table 4 show the regression results for the benchmark
speciﬁcation (1). In both countries and for all reference incomes, βy is greater than αy. This
means that the compensation of an adult for working full time is greater than the cost of a
child.
We extend the benchmark regression (1) in order to test the results of Section 3 using
the three following regression models:
EIRi,y =
(
nA + αy · nC + βy · nW + γy · nC ·DWN + δy · nC ·DF
)θy
+
+by · PERSONALi + ei,y , (2)
EIRi,y =
(
nA + αy · nC + γy · nC ·DWN + δy · nC ·DF + ζy · nA ·DWN + ηy · nA ·DF
)θy
+
+by · PERSONALi + ei,y ,(3)
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EIRi,y =
(
nA + αy · nC + γy · nC ·DWN + ζy · nA ·DWN + ϕy · nC ·DW + χy · nC ·DWW+
+ψy · nA ·DW + ωy · nA ·DWW
)θy
+ by · PERSONALi + ei,y . (4)
These models introduce the following four dummy variables:
DWN : takes the value 1 for a traditional household (WN - either with or without
children).
DF : 1 for either W or WW households (the symbol “DF” denotes the status of
full labor-market participation).
DW : 1 for W .
DWW : 1 for WW .
Speciﬁcation (2) extends (1) by distinguishing the eﬀect of a nonrestrictive vs. a restric-
tive reduction in NMTE on child costs: the eﬀect of a nonrestrictive reduction in NMTE
is captured by including the interaction nC ·DWN , while nC ·DF captures the other eﬀect.
Speciﬁcation (3) extends (2) by adding a distinction of the eﬀect of a nonrestrictive vs. a
restrictive reduction in NMTE on the costs of adults: the inclusion of nA ·DWN and nA ·DF
(which necessitates dropping nW ). Using DW and DWW , (4) further distinguishes the eﬀects
of restrictive reductions in NMTE on singles vs. couples.
The estimates of (2) through (4) are presented in columns “Spec. 2” through “Spec. 4”
of Table 4. The pattern seen in Figure 1 and tested in Table 3 is reconﬁrmed: child costs are
higher in time-constrained families compared to households in which at least one adult is
nonworking. This can be seen by the general pattern that, in most cases, γy is statistically
insigniﬁcant whereas δy, or ϕy and χy, are signiﬁcant. In the two exceptions where γy is
signiﬁcantly positive, its value is smaller than the estimates of ϕy and χy.
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Two further results are of interest. The estimates of ζy are always lower than these
of ηy, or ψy and ωy. This comparison indicates that the traditional household is able to
achieve gains from specialization not only with respect to child-related activities (as γy <
χy implies), but also with respect to other home activities (see Apps and Rees (2001)).
Moreover, as in Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005), the estimates of θy are seen
to fall with reference income, implying that the rich exhibit a higher ability to share within
the household. This property has received both theoretical attention and empirical support
(see Donaldson and Pendakur (2004, 2006)).
All reported estimates in Table 4 are controlled for respondents’ personal characteristics.
Although the inclusion of personal characteristics adds some explanatory power to the re-
gressions (it increases R¯2), it does not alter the levels of the reported estimates. None of the
personal characteristics appeared robust, so they are not reported in Table 4 (these results
are providable by the authors upon request).
Table 5 presents a summary of ranges of child costs based on estimates of (4) compared
to estimates by Apps and Rees (2001) for couples. In Apps and Rees (2001, p. 645), the sum
of time costs and purchased goods for child-related activities is about 78% to 98% of the
total consumption of an adult male. These numbers are higher than ours. This diﬀerence
may be due to: (i) the particular assumptions concerning within-household sharing rules
and household-production functions that enable identiﬁcation of the Apps-Rees demand
system; (ii) that, for our survey, respondents were instructed to consider children of age 7-11
years, who may require less child-care time than preschoolers (Bradbury (2005, pp. 20-21)).
Nevertheless, our questionnaire can be modiﬁed to focus on preschoolers in future research.
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5. Policy implications for child tax allowances
Estimating equivalent incomes of families with children contingent upon the labor-market-
participation status of adults has important implications not only for anti-poverty policies,
but also for policies to reduce unemployment. For example, according to Table 2, a single
nonworking parent of one child in Germany would need to receive EUR 802 monthly in
order to be at the same level of well-being as that of a single childless adult living on social
assistance (who receives about EUR 500). These numbers imply equitable social assistance
for these two family types.
If this single parent was, instead, working, then the equivalent disposable monthly income
is about EUR 1228, according to the estimates of Table 2. This number helps to understand
the possibility faced by low-income single parents to fall into an unemployment trap: EUR
1228 corresponds to the 31-st percentile of the German disposable-income distribution of
single parents with one child in year 2003 (authors’ calculations based on the most recent
German Income and Expenditure Survey “Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS)”).
Thus, to provide work incentives to a single parent of one child, the tax/transfer system needs
to ensure that the disposable income of this parent is higher than EUR 1228, conditional
upon that she/he works.
In some countries the link between parenthood and work incentives is taken into ac-
count. The income transfer systems for low-income families, the “Earned Income Tax Credit”
(EITC) in the US and the “Working Families’ Tax Credit” (WFTC) in the UK, condition tax
credits on the labor-market-participation status of parents. For example, WFTC is higher
if families work longer hours in the labor market (at least 30 hours per week) and WFTC is
increasing in the number of dependent children (see Brewer (2001) for further details). In
some US states EITC also increases with the number of children (see Neumark and Wascher
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(2007, p. 6)).
The results presented here support the practice of the WFTC tax code to distinguish
the hours worked by parents, as well as this of the EITC to increase beneﬁts according to
the number of children. These distinctions point in the right direction for increasing work
incentives for parents. However, the empirical literature concerning the impact of EITC on
unemployment is controversial. For example, the empirical literature typically ﬁnds evidence
of positive eﬀects of EITC beneﬁts on the employment of parents (see Cancian and Levinson
(2006, pp. 796-797) for a literature review), while Cancian and Levinson (2006) who focus
on Wisconsin, where extra EITC supplements for families with children are provided, have
found no such eﬀect. It is therefore of critical importance to estimate the threshold income
level that must be exceeded in order to provide suﬃcient work incentives for parents (such
as our estimate of EUR 1228 for single parents with one child in Germany). We believe we
have shown how survey-based data can help to identify these thresholds.
6. Concluding remarks
Child rearing requires parental time. Time-use data indicate that parents devote a substan-
tial part of their leisure time to raise children. Consequently, working parents must either
reduce their already limited leisure even more, or buy child-care and other housework ser-
vices in the market. This means that parents may face additional opportunity costs upon
deciding to start working full time: children in the household can have an eﬀect on the
reservation wages of the adults.
We have designed a survey instrument in order to collect everyday people’s insights about
the magnitude of income compensation required to maintain a constant family well-being
when adults are working vs. when they are nonworking. According to our survey respondents
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in Belgium and Germany, labor-market-participation compensation is higher when children
are in the household, except for the case when only one of two nonworking parents decides to
go to work. Consistently our estimates of child costs are higher in time-constrained families,
compared to households where at least one adult is nonworking.
Our study supports that policies channeling extra income-tax allowances to working
parents are likely to reduce the possibility that parents ﬁnd themselves trapped in unem-
ployment and poverty. Examples of such policies are the EITC in the US and the WFTC
in the UK.
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         Table 1. Personal characteristics of respondents 
 Belgium Germany 
 N=149 N=164 
 N % N % 
Gender     
Female           69 46.3 56 34.1 
Male             80 53.7 108 65.9 
Partner     
Yes              109 73.2 69 42.1 
No               40 26.8 95 57.9 
Children     
None             80 53.7 140 85.4 
One              17 11.4 18 11.0 
Two              31 20.8 5 3.0 
More than two    21 14.1 1 0.6 
Siblings     
None             1 0.7 30 18.3 
One              10 6.7 51 31.1 
Two              69 46.3 57 34.8 
More than two    69 46.3 26 15.8 
Age     
Below 20 years       1 0.7 0 0.0 
Between 20 and 40 years    108 72.5 147 89.6 
Above 40 years       40 26.8 17 10.4 
Education          
Unfinished education      0 0.0 1 0.6 
Element. school    1 0.7 1 0.6 
Second. school      10 6.7 3 1.8 
Special German second. School --- --- 2 1.2 
German second. School --- --- 98 59.8 
Techn. school or university 138 92.6 59 36.0 
Occupational group        
Social-sec. rec. or unemployed         1 0.7 1 0.6 
Blue-collar worker        3 2.0 1 0.6 
White-collar worker        118 79.2 45 27.4 
Civil servant                11 7.4 8 4.8 
Pupil/student/trainee       12 8.1 102 62.4 
Self-employed              2 1.3 5 3.0 
Pensioner                    2 1.3 1 0.6 
Housewife/houseman           0 0.0 1 0.6 
Own working time       
Not working                 3 2.0 27 16.5 
Working irregularly          6 4.0 63 38.4 
Working 1/2 day     3 2.0 25 15.2 
Working 1/1 day      137 91.9 49 29.9 
Working time of partner         
Not working               51 34.2 117 71.3 
Working irregularly        0 0.0 6 3.7 
Working 1/2 day   17 11.4 12 7.3 
Working 1/1 day    81 54.4 29 17.7 
After-tax household income     
Below EUR 875 4 2.7 64 39.0 
Between EUR 875 and EUR 1625 36 24.2 46 28.0 
Between EUR 1625 and EUR 2375 28 18.8 24 14.6 
Between EUR 2375 and EUR 3125 41 27.5 18 11.0 
EUR 3125 or above 40 26.8 12 7.4 
 
Table 2. Average stated equivalent incomes (values in Euros) 
Belgium  Germany 
 Singles Couples Singles Couples 
yr  N W NN WN WW N W NN WN WW 
No 
children --- 
803.34 
(23.24) 
879.09 
(13.76) 
1140.21 
(31.23) 
1449.88 
(53.21) --- 
903.35 
(21.66) 
977.13 
(18.63) 
1314.33 
(33.50) 
1715.85 
(53.18) 
1 
child 
758.37 
(9.45) 
1089.86 
(24.79) 
1133.79 
(20.00) 
1392.81 
(33.78) 
1765.01 
(56.74) 
802.13 
(8.43) 
1227.90 
(25.65) 
1266.10 
(20.52) 
1603.96 
(36.27) 
2070.58 
(55.63) 
2 
children 
970.12 
(16.80) 
1327.70 
(30.53) 
1350.72 
(26.78) 
1614.35 
(37.39) 
2014.79 
(62.86) 
1073.41 
(16.59) 
1498.63 
(31.90) 
1522.38 
(27.41) 
1866.16 
(4.36) 
2371.19 
(61.40) 
500 
3 
children 
1179.53 
(24.82) 
1560.98 
(39.79) 
1570.64 
(34.96) 
1826.42 
(42.18) 
2255.48 
(71.41) 
1323.05 
(26.58) 
1758.69 
(40.93) 
1747.35 
(34.96) 
2102.74 
(52.20) 
2645.58 
(70.85) 
No 
children --- 
2621.05 
(64.76) 
3096.03 
(51.36) 
3567.15 
(89.02) 
4177.36 
(145.19) --- 
2829.57 
(67.48) 
3227.29 
(57.10) 
3856.16 
(89.18) 
4718.60 
(147.11) 
1 
child 
2465.65 
(29.81) 
3158.14 
(78.34) 
3541.10 
(71.35) 
4042.99 
(105.57) 
4743.60 
(157.43) 
2460.37 
(36.42) 
3308.08 
(82.82) 
3628.81 
(78.24) 
4287.35 
(109.57) 
5249.54 
(168.85) 
2 
children 
2861.60 
(54.66) 
3602.28 
(97.20) 
3935.85 
(96.26) 
4450.42 
(127.00) 
5200.36 
(174.53) 
2812.20 
(56.29) 
3700.30 
(98.11) 
3960.06 
(91.18) 
4622.41 
(119.55) 
5660.76 
(181.48) 
2000 
3 
children 
3248.36 
(78.86) 
4048.30 
(123.27) 
4334.96 
(126.87) 
4891.62 
(162.00) 
5680.31 
(202.46) 
3149.39 
(78.51) 
4066.74 
(117.10) 
4297.53 
(116.45) 
4969.21 
(139.19) 
6092.07 
(203.18) 
No 
children --- 
4283.06 
(101.23) 
5106.26 
(96.35) 
5814.46 
(162.29) 
6676.81 
(246.29) --- 
4540.70 
(94.02) 
5277.44 
(92.51) 
6135.82 
(139.01) 
7432.32 
(228.72) 
1 
child 
4098.56 
(51.18) 
4992.76 
(126.82) 
5695.85 
(128.51) 
6403.61 
(185.71) 
7385.56 
(272.41) 
3980.95 
(31.45) 
5104.73 
(105.89) 
5752.10 
(108.92) 
6695.43 
(157.54) 
8077.59 
(246.22) 
2 
children 
4642.07 
(95.51) 
5588.97 
(160.52) 
6275.42 
(169.05) 
6972.32 
(215.22) 
8035.56 
(303.25) 
4410.34 
(63.10) 
5576.07 
(124.63) 
6175.15 
(128.12) 
7141.49 
(177.50) 
8592.84 
(265.15) 
3500 
3 
children 
5188.36 
(141.92) 
6210.34 
(207.81) 
6852.39 
(203.06) 
7574.81 
(257.13) 
8705.11 
(344.42) 
4815.52 
(94.54) 
6028.02 
(148.12) 
6594.02 
(155.18) 
7582.62 
(201.16) 
9100.91 
(285.35) 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. yr denotes the level of reference income in Euros; each N denotes a nonworking adult, each W denotes a (full-time) working adult. 
 
Table 3. Stated NMTE-decrease compensations (values in Euros) 
Belgium 
Singles Couples 
 
N → W 
(restrictive NMTE decrease) 
NN → WN 
(nonrestrictive NMTE decrease) 
WN → WW 
(restrictive NMTE decrease) 
yr   
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
Mean 303.34 331.49 357.58 381.45 261.11 259.02 263.63 255.78 309.67 372.20 400.44 429.07 
Median 250.00 250.00 275.00 300.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 250.00 300.00 
Std.error (23.24) (22.72) (24.56) (28.07) (24.57) (25.26) (26.27) (23.50) (28.30) (31.17) (34.94) (39.73) 
Wilcoxon 
500 
p-value 
            3.53***              4.53***      2.78*** 
            [0.00]         [0.00]       [0.01] 
             0.50          0.77         0.39 
            [0.62]       [0.44]      [0.70] 
             5.41***      3.18***        4.01***  
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Mean 621.05 692.49 740.68 799.94 471.11 501.89 514.56 556.66 610.21 700.61 749.95 788.68 
Median 400.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 300.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 
Std.error (64.76) (70.41) (75.30) (81.77) (61.94) (66.32) (69.99) (84.01) (68.70) (70.32) (73.10) (74.60) 
Wilcoxon 
2000 
p-value 
            4.31***         4.00***     5.13*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]       [0.00] 
             1.93*            0.73          2.69*** 
            [0.05]      [0.46]       [0.01] 
             6.20***      4.31***          4.52*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]        [0.00] 
Mean 783.06 894.19 946.90 1021.98 708.19 707.77 696.90 722.42 862.36 981.95 1063.24 1130.31 
Median 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 600.00 
Std.error (101.23) (105.82) (110.61) (118.70) (107.56) (106.56) (105.83) (109.54) (107.45) (116.76) (126.65) (132.15) 
Wilcoxon 
3500 
p-value 
            6.40***             4.25***          3.90*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]        [0.00] 
             0.76            0.94          0.28 
            [0.45]      [0.34]       [0.78] 
             5.67***      5.16***           5.15*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
 
 
Table 3 continued.  
Germany 
Singles Couples 
 
N → W 
(restrictive NMTE decrease) 
NN → WN 
(nonrestrictive NMTE decrease) 
WN → WW 
(restrictive NMTE decrease) 
yr   
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
No 
children
 
1  
child 
2  
children 
3  
children 
Mean 403.35 425.76 425.21 435.64 337.20 337.87 343.78 355.47 401.52 466.62 505.03 542.83 
Median 312.50 350.00 350.00 350.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 300.00 325.00 350.00 
Std.error (21.66) (22.95) (25.48) (28.12) (24.85) (26.26) (28.15) (34.20) (29.06) (29.59) (31.95) (34.91) 
Wilcoxon 
500 
p-value 
            2.26**                0.64         1.24 
            [0.02]         [0.52]       [0.21] 
             0.97          0.91         0.67 
            [0.33]       [0.36]      [0.50] 
             7.01***      5.14***        4.92***  
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Mean 829.57 847.71 888.11 917.35 628.87 658.54 662.35 671.68 862.44 962.20 1038.35 1122.87 
Median 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 575.00 625.00 750.00 
Std.error (67.48) (68.75) (73.09) (78.28) (59.94) (63.23) (64.58) (65.14) (86.14) (91.39) (97.50) (105.26) 
Wilcoxon 
2000 
p-value 
            4.22***         4.03***     3.36*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]       [0.00] 
             2.96***         1.23         1.83* 
            [0.00]       [0.22]       [0.07] 
             7.27***      5.68***          5.88*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]        [0.00] 
Mean 1040.70 1123.78 1165.73 1212.50 858.38 943.32 966.34 988.60 1296.49 1382.16 1451.34 1518.29 
Median 500.00 700.00 725.00 750.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 875.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 
Std.error (94.02) (100.14) (105.44) (110.51) (85.63) (94.53) (97.95) (101.58) (131.09) (135.11) (139.05) (142.21) 
Wilcoxon 
3500 
p-value 
            5.24***             3.97***          4.93*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]         [0.00] 
             3.97***         2.28**       2.70*** 
             [0.00]       [0.02]      [0.01] 
             5.78***      5.44***           4.57*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
NOTE:  yr denotes the reference income in Euros. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4. Regressions for estimating child costs 
Belgium 
yr yr = 500 yr = 2000 yr = 3500 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
αy Cn  
0.67*** 
(0.03) 
0.59*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.03) 
0.59*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.34*** 
(0.03) 
0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.33*** 
(0.03) 
βy Wn  
0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.75*** 
(0.06) 
  0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.51*** 
(0.06) 
  0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
  
γy WNC Dn ⋅   
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
 -0.01 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
δy FC Dn ⋅   
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
  0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
  0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
 
ζy WNA Dn ⋅    
0.30*** 
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
  0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
  0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
ηy FA Dn ⋅    
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
   0.51*** 
(0.05) 
   0.48*** 
(0.06) 
 
φy WC Dn ⋅     
0.10** 
(0.05) 
   0.10** 
(0.05) 
   0.07 
(0.06) 
χy WWC
Dn ⋅
 
   0.20** 
(0.09) 
   0.24** 
(0.11) 
   0.22* 
(0.12) 
ψy  WA Dn ⋅     
0.75*** 
(0.06) 
   0.48*** 
(0.07) 
   0.42*** 
(0.08) 
ωy WWA Dn ⋅     
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
   0.51*** 
(0.08) 
   0.49*** 
(0.09) 
θy  
0.85*** 
(0.02) 
0.88*** 
(0.02) 
0.88*** 
(0.02) 
0.85*** 
(0.02) 
0.68*** 
(0.02) 
0.69*** 
(0.02) 
0.70*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.59*** 
(0.03) 
2
R  0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
 
Table 4 continued.  
Germany 
yr yr = 500 yr = 2000 yr = 3500 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
αy Cn  
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.03) 
0.55*** 
(0.03) 
0.58*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.02) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.30*** 
(0.02) 
0.30*** 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.02) 
0.21*** 
(0.02) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
βy Wn  
0.95*** 
(0.04) 
0.82*** 
(0.05) 
  0.77*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.06) 
  0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.05) 
  
γy WNC Dn ⋅   
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
 -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
 -0.03 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.07) 
δy FC Dn ⋅   
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
  0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
  0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
 
ζy WNA Dn ⋅    
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.04) 
  0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
  0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.05) 
ηy FA Dn ⋅    
0.81*** 
(0.05) 
   0.66*** 
(0.05) 
   0.58*** 
(0.05) 
 
φy WC Dn ⋅     
0.09** 
(0.04) 
   0.07 
(0.05) 
   0.12*** 
(0.04) 
χy WWC
Dn ⋅
 
   0.18** 
(0.07) 
   0.20** 
(0.09) 
   0.30*** 
(0.11) 
ψy  WA Dn ⋅     
0.80*** 
(0.06) 
   0.62*** 
(0.07) 
   0.40*** 
(0.07) 
ωy WWA Dn ⋅     
0.86*** 
(0.07) 
   0.70*** 
(0.08) 
   0.71*** 
(0.10) 
θy  
0.93*** 
(0.02) 
0.96*** 
(0.02) 
0.96*** 
(0.02) 
0.92*** 
(0.02) 
0.72*** 
(0.02) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
0.75*** 
(0.02) 
0.70*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.01) 
0.68*** 
(0.02) 
0.68*** 
(0.02) 
0.58*** 
(0.02) 
2
R  0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
NOTE: Regressions for each reference income (yr denotes the reference-income level in Euros). Endogenous variable: equivalent-income ratio, 
i.e. equivalent income stated by respondents divided by the reference income of a nonworking single childless adult. Number of observations: 
2831 in Belgium; 3116 in Germany. White’s heteroskedasticity correction for covariance matrix; standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5. Child costs relative to an adult in WN vs. WW households 
Spec. 4 
Belgium Germany Apps & Rees (2001) yr 
WN WW WN WW WN (average income) WW (average income) 
Poor (500) 0.59 0.79 0.58 0.76 
Middle (2000) 0.36 0.60 0.30 0.50 
rich (3500) 0.33 0.55 0.37 0.49 
0.24-0.40a 
0.82-0.98b 
0.53-0.69a 
0.78-0.91b 
NOTE: yr denotes the reference-income level in Euros.  
        
a denotes a model specification without considering household production and parental child care.  
        b denotes a model specification considering household production and parental child care. 
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Figure 1.  Equivalent incomes as functions of non-market time endowments. In each of the 
twelve graphs the dashed lines are the “No children” lines shifted upwards in a parallel manner 
in order to stress the change in the time/money tradeoff due to the presence of children. 
Reference incomes appear in parentheses.
Appendix 
 
Survey instrument documentation  
 
1. Purpose of the survey 
In general, different household types may need different income amounts in order to attain a given 
living standard. These income amounts may depend on the number of adults and children 
living in the household. Furthermore, household needs may depend on the labor-market-
participation status of the adults (nonworking or working full time) since this might affect, for 
example, the time adults can spend for cooking or educating their children. Therefore, the 
following question arises:  
 
Given the income of a specific household type (reference household), what is the income that 
can make another household type (that differs with respect to the number of children and/or 
adults and/or number of working adults) attain an identical living standard as the reference 
household? 
 
Since there does not exist an objectively correct answer, we would like to know your 
subjective assessment of this question.  
 
 
2. Personal characteristics 
 
We would like to ask you to state some of your own personal characteristics. Please mark the 
boxes that apply to you. Your answers will be treated confidentially and only for the stated 
research purpose. 
 
1) Please state your gender:          male 
female 
 
2) Are you living together with a partner?     yes 
no 
  
2a) In case your answer to question 2) is “yes:” 
 Is your partner working      not at all 
part time 
full time 
irregularly? 
 
 
3) How many children live in your household?    0 
1 
2 
3 or more 
 
4) What is your after-tax family income per month?                        below 1.75P* 
          1.75P – 3.25P 
          3.25P – 4.75P 
                    4.75P – 6.25P 
          6.25P and above 
( *Note to researcher: P is the “poverty line” in a country (see Section 2 for details).) 
 5) Are you         social-security 
recipient 
unemployed 
blue-collar worker 
white-collar worker 
civil servant 
pupil, student, or 
trainee 
self-employed 
pensioner 
houseman/wife? 
 
 
6) Are you working        not at all 
part-time 
full-time 
irregularly? 
 
 
7) Please state your education level:     no degree 
elementary school 
          secondary school 
          technical school or  
university 
 
8) Please state the number of siblings you lived together with  
during your childhood:       0 
          1 
          2 
          3 or more 
 
 
9) Please mark the correct age category you belong to:   below 20 years 
20 – 40 years 
40 years and older 
 
 
 
 
3. Income assessment 
In the tables below you shall evaluate three different situations. These situations differ by the pre-
specified after-tax monthly income (including all social transfers) of a nonworking-single-
childless-adult household. Now consider, for each situation separately, that the size and 
composition of the households change as indicated in the table.  
 
Below, we give you an example of such a table. Please take some time to familiarize yourself 
with the structure of the table. 
  
 
1 adult,  
nonworking 
1 adult, 
working full 
time 
2 adults, 
both 
nonworking 
2 adults, 
1 nonworking, 
1 working full 
time 
2 adults, 
both working 
full time 
0 children Reference 
income 
    
1 child 
 
     
2 children 
 
     
3 children 
 
     
 
Within a given table, all household types should attain the same living standard. Please, fill in 
the cells putting the after-tax/transfer family income that you believe brings the households 
that differ with respect to the numbers of children, adults, and working adults, to the same 
living standard as the one of the nonworking single childless adult.  
 
Please, complete the following three tables. For your assessment assume that adults are 
between 35 and 55 and children between 7 and 11 years old. 
 
(Note to researcher: In the actual survey three tables having the same structure as above 
were provided, each for a different reference income in increasing order). 
 
